Interview with Dr Giuseppe Spatafora

Last Updated: 20 January 2026|1297 words|6 min read|Categories: interviews|

The American threat on Greenland

Interview with Dr Giuseppe Spatafora, Research Analyst on Transatlantic Relations at the European Institute for Strategic Studies (EUISS)

America’s spectacular assault on Venezuela’s President Maduro on January 3rd has had as one of many consequences that President Donald Trump’s earlier threats on Greenland, Denmark’s autonomous territory, have become even more credible. Indeed, the current American administration seems intent to either buy or annex the world’s greatest non-continental island to enhance US security or to exploit the territory’s resources. This raises major threats for both Denmark and the EU (even though Greenland is not formally part of it) as well as for NATO, whose intrinsic value risks becoming void. We ask Dr Giuseppe Spatafora, at EUISS, what really motivates Donald Trump, what role diplomacy could still play, and what the consequences of a plausible annexation scenario would be.

 

Q1. Before getting to the heart of the matter, can you remind what the real motivations of President Donald Trump’s annexation threats are? Is this about enhancing US security in face of a real Chinese and Russian presence in the region? Is it all about looting Greenland’s critical materials? Or is it the mere willingness to renew and extend the Monroe doctrine and put flesh on a neo-imperialist foreign policy?

I believe that the threat of Russia and China is just one of the many motivations that Trump brings to justify his desire to annex Greenland. In fact, the threat of Russia and China appears modest at the time being (there is little evidence of significant naval presence near the island, compared to places like Svalbard, for instance). And there is no reason why the US wouldn’t be able to deal with this threat by cooperating with Denmark (who has expressed openness to allowing the US to open additional bases in Greenland, just like during the Cold War) and other allied countries as opposed to occupying Greenland. So, the reason must be another one. In fact, I believe that Trump wants to “make America greater” in the physical sense, by expanding the country and securing an indelible legacy. He has tried to do it in other areas, for instance by renaming the Gulf of Mexico “Gulf of America” and arguing that Canada should be the 51st state of the US. This could be part of the “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine – since it hasn’t been defined, anything can go in it, from removing rival heads of state to expanding the US territory. You should also add to it Trump’s “real estate” instincts, as he believes that “ownership gives you something more than lease”.

 

Q2. After the spectacular attack in Venezuela, President Trump has said he would be “dealing with Greenland in about two months”. This comes after previous threats and symbolic visits of both the Vice-President and his son on the island. Yet it seems America’s concerns for security or its willingness to exploit resources can be met by greater diplomatic engagement with Denmark and Greenland. Why does diplomacy seem to fail?

As we have seen in the remarks given by the Danish foreign minister after the meeting at the White House earlier this week, there is a fundamental point of disagreement that diplomacy cannot yet solve: Trump doesn’t want to settle for anything less than territorial control over Greenland, and that is a red line for both Denmark and Greenland. The Danes have offered many things to Trump – allowing more US troops, reopening old bases, increasing defence spending and their own presence in the Arctic, carrying out exercises in the region with NATO allies – but they are not enough as long as the US objective remains annexation. The other reason why this is difficult to understand is the almost surrealistic environment in which the standoff takes place: as Europe prepared for a greater threat from Russia and expected an American disengagement from the continent, not many people expected to be arguing with the US (Europe’s traditional ally) over the potential annexation of part of a sovereign European country’s territory. These are really uncharted waters, where past diplomatic practice helps very little.

 

Q3. How likely do you think the threat of annexation is at this very moment, considering the lesser likelihood of a “purchase” of the island and/or its inhabitants, and the failed visit of the Danish and Greenlandic Ministers to Washington? What would the consequences be on both NATO as an alliance upholding solidarity and international law and the EU as a political entity potentially seeing one of its members occupied?

A military operation over Greenland remains unlikely. There are no US assets moving towards the Arctic. The US public, and a large number of US senators, including Republicans, are strongly opposed to the move. While Trump has been a very interventionist president so far, he has not moved yet militarily against an ally (but you never know…). What could be more likely is a continuation of covert operations to study the Greenlandic population’s attitudes and potentially support independentist moves – dealing with an independent Greenland would be much easier, as the US could use carrots such as a “Compact of Free Association” to obtain what it wants. There could even be a “Crimea model” whereby agents are infiltrated into the island to foment independentism. Again, these are all speculations – not reality as of yet. But it’s good to know all options.

For NATO, it would be uncharted waters: while there are examples of allied countries having a major standoff (see Greece and Turkey over Cyprus), these instances have never involved the biggest ally, the US. It would therefore be very difficult for the alliance to navigate it. European countries also have to weigh the trade-off between confronting the US and keeping Washington on their side to secure a favourable peace in Ukraine and develop the sufficient capabilities to deter Russia on their own. The US knows it and may want to put a “Greenland-for-Ukraine” bargain on the table, putting the Europeans against a very difficult dilemma.

 

Q4. Germany and the United Kingdom seem to be willing to up the game by setting up a NATO mission together with Greenland on the model of NATO’s “Baltic sentry” previous operation and minor troop contingents were just deployed by France, Sweden or Norway. This coincides somewhat with NATO’s Rutte belated, declarations. How positive is this? Should the EU be doing more in terms of troops deployment or threats of sanctions?

Using NATO as a platform to deal with Arctic security makes a lot of sense – it is the natural institution where a mission can be planned and implemented (and one would expect the US to highlight its concerns over Arctic security in that forum). These exercises and troop surges make a lot of sense from a NATO perspective, as they would ensure deterrence against Russia and potentially China. The added value of an increased presence is that it would increase the costs for any subversive action to destabilise Greenland– from any direction. Would this prevent the US president from carrying out any actions if he were dead set on it? I’m not sure. But if the costs are higher, and enough people in the US and Trump’s entourage believe that expansion is not worth undermining transatlantic relations, it can be used to persuade him.

And then, who knows, Trump is volatile and can change his mind (although, on Greenland, he has been consistent for one year, if not more…). Just like the NATO summit persuaded him that European countries are taking their defence seriously, they could end up persuading him that he got what he wanted.

 

Interview conducted on Friday, 16 January 2026

Interview with Pr. Sara Hagemann, University of Copenhaguen
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