Interview of Zsolt Darvas

Last Updated: 9 October 2025|1249 words|6 min read|Categories: interviews|

On 16 July 2025, the Commission presented its proposal for an « ambitious and dynamic » Multiannual Financial Framework (“MFF”) amounting to almost EUR 2 trillion (or 1.26% of the EU’s gross national income, on average, between 2028 and 2034). The package includes many new features, including simpler programmes, more flexibility, national and regional partnership plans to anchor investment and reforms, as well as a balanced package of own resources. Yet, the new budget proposal has been met with a lot of criticism from capitals on the grounds that it would be too large or too conditional. We ask Zsolt Darvas, Senior Fellow at Bruegel, where the real critical arguments may be.

 

Q1. What is your general, “first glance” assessment of the new MFF proposal as far as the key parameters (size, structure, spending allocation and funding) are concerned?

The proposal is less ambitious than what is needed to fully meet Europe’s priorities, yet more ambitious than I initially thought politically feasible. It foresees a modest increase in size when measured as a share of Gross National Income (GNI, the appropriate metric for budget size) along with a substantial restructuring of EU spending. It also includes major simplifications for faster implementation and introduces tools to enhance flexibility in addressing unforeseen circumstances. While it still falls short of the ambition required, my hope is that it will not be significantly watered down in the forthcoming negotiations.

 

Q2. You argued in a short post recently that the agricultural income subsidies can hardly be justified at the EU level anymore. Yet, the linkage made between disbursements and the national and regional partnership plans is already a radical change to the structure of the EU budget, making it difficult to imagine the EU also stepping away from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). How do you see discussions on the CAP evolve from this point? 

Let me clarify: I did not propose dismantling the CAP. While there could be a rationale for that, it would go too far. Instead, my suggestion was that although CAP rules should continue to be set at the EU level, financing most CAP spending should be shifted to national budgets. This is because the direct transfer component to farmers functions primarily as a social policy, which offers little pan-European added value. For instance, while the Commission sometimes justifies these direct payments by arguing they contribute to EU food security, our research has refuted this claim.

The Commission’s proposal does aim for significant CAP reform, including a stronger focus on smaller farms and the introduction of a new performance framework. While some proposed result indicators, such as “GHG emissions avoided”, are appropriate, others lean toward input measures, for example, “the number of new young farmers and other new entrants in agriculture supported.” It remains to be seen whether the final framework will include a robust and meaningful set of performance indicators.

Given the political sensitivity of agriculture, partly due to farmers’ ability to stage high-profile protests, such as blocking city centres with tractors, I do not expect major departures from the current CAP structure.

 

Q3. Are you concerned the national and regional partnership plans risk leading to greater centralisation and thus affect the quality of cohesion policy currently implemented at regional level when, in addition to this, cohesion funds are foreseen to be more limited?

Indeed, I see a risk that the role of regions and cities will be diminished. The Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) prepared under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) do not provide a good template: although the regulation required consultation with various stakeholders during the preparation phase, in most countries no meaningful consultations took place.

 

Q4. What is your judgement on the new Competitiveness fund, which is meant to bolster the EU’s investment programmes and direct them in four areas: clean transition and decarbonisation, digital transition, health and biotech, agriculture and bioeconomy, defence and space? Are the priorities and size rightly crafted?

The main positive aspects of the Competitiveness fund proposal include its strategic focus, the harmonisation of rules and simplification of administrative processes, its objective of mobilising private investment, and the higher level of funding compared to similar instruments in the current MFF. At the same time, concerns have been raised about the potential shift toward greater centralisation of funding decisions. In particular, the League of European Research Universities has highlighted a number of governance-related issues with the proposed fund.

 

Q5. On the revenue side, the European Commission has proposed five new own resources, ranging from some Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and Common Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) contributions to new taxes on non-collected e-waste and tobacco consumption and production, and, more controversially, a corporate resource for Europe (CORE). How do you see these proposals, and the new levy on large corporates (net turnover of at least 100 mn EUR) in particular?

With the exception of CORE, the other proposals appear sensible. Revenues linked to EU competences, such as foreign trade and customs, should arguably be channelled to the EU budget, with only a small share, perhaps 2%, retained by member states to cover collection costs. The ETS and CBAM fall into this category, as do customs duties. The Commission has proposed reducing the current 25% retention by member states on customs revenues to 10%. This is a step in the right direction, but I would argue that countries should retain no more than 2%. The proposed levies on uncollected e-waste and tobacco could help fund EU-wide priorities, such as environmental sustainability and public health, and are therefore welcome. That said, all of these potential EU budget revenues would reduce the resources available to national budgets, without changing the fundamental reality that higher national contributions will still be needed to finance the EU budget.

By contrast, the CORE proposal has several weaknesses. A turnover tax is distortive, as it imposes a disproportionate burden on firms depending on their profit margins. For example, a 0.1% turnover tax equals a 0.5% profit tax for a company with a 20% profit margin, but a 5% tax for a company with only a 2% margin. In the EU, financial services, oil and gas distribution, and semiconductor equipment industries typically operate with margins above 20%, whereas chemicals, food wholesalers, and retail services often have margins closer to 2%. Moreover, because a turnover tax is applied at each stage of production, it effectively taxes intermediate inputs, discourages specialisation, and incentivises vertical integration, thereby undermining competition and reducing economic efficiency. Finally, under CORE, contributions would not be strictly proportional to turnover but instead paid as specific lump-sum amounts. This would result in larger firms generally paying less as a share of turnover than smaller firms, weakening the competitive position of the latter.

 

Q6. What is your sense of the likely dynamics of the discussions at the Council and at the European Parliament on the new proposals? It seems a budget has rarely been met with such criticisms, in contrast with the stringent need to spend more and better while reacting to more regular crises?

Representatives of the European Parliament, EU member states, and various interest groups have voiced a wide range of criticisms. For example, agricultural stakeholders oppose the reduction of CAP payments, regions are concerned about their diminished role, finance ministries resist any increase in national contributions to the EU budget, and some experts argue that the proposal lacks sufficient ambition to strengthen the EU’s competitiveness. The final outcome is difficult to predict, but it is likely that a compromise will only emerge toward the end of the current seven-year framework in 2027.

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