Interview with Sébastien Maillard, Special Advisor (Grande Europe Centre), Jacques Delors Institute, Associate Fellow, Europe Programme, Chatham House
Interview conducted on September 27, 2023
Q1. Were the internal dynamics (formation of majorities, political alliances, etc.) of the European Parliament notably different from those observed in previous legislatures, as the results of the 2019 European elections suggested?
Yes, this was evident from the outset. If the Greens had not made such a breakthrough in the 2019 election, diminishing the prominence of the European People’s Party (EPP) and preventing a potential majority with the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – the usual EPP/S&D coalition – the European Green Deal championed by the Commission President would not have taken centre stage during the 2019-2024 term. In this alternative scenario, at the very least, the Green Deal would not have been as…green! This starting point changed the fundamental dynamics within the Parliament.
At the same time, members of the Greens group appeared to be well integrated into the majority and open to the compromises inherent to the functioning of the European institutions.
Five years ago, there was much debate about the place of the far right, which came out on top, especially in France. However, in this legislature, the lawmakers of the Identity and Democracy (ID) group were unable to obstruct anything. Despite some political stunts, these members constituted more of a “deadweight” than a truly obstructive or influential element in the debates. The influence of the broader far right [with the ECR] was also hindered by the division within this camp between pro-Russians and anti-Russians in the context of the war in Ukraine.
The EPP group had to face a decisive moment with the departure of Fidesz. Viktor Orban’s political drifting and infringements on the rule of law in Hungary effectively pushed the EPP to kick the Hungarian party out and clarify its positioning, even if it came at the cost of a loss of influence. Moreover, on its right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group competes with it, and this competition is expected to grow in the next legislature.
The Renew group, which in 2019 benefited from the European impetus of the French President, has not yet fully entered the “big league”, like the larger and more established EPP and S&D groups in the Parliament. That being said, its members remain essential: they broker compromises and are key to building majorities. But internally, it is a group that lacks cohesion: French Macronists and German liberals, for example, are far from sharing the same analysis on certain matters.
The S&D group does not stand out as a significant force in proposing different issues. Nevertheless, it remains a pro-European force that has not marginalised itself in the hemicycle and has played the game of compromise and coalition-building. However, there is no alliance between the radical left (the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left GUE/NGL) and the centre-left in the European Parliament. Finally, the S&D group was greatly weakened by the Qatargate scandal, which particularly affected it, just as it also harmed the entire Parliament.
Q2. On which subjects would you say that political divisions have been the most pronounced? Were these divisions surprising to you, or, on the contrary, in line with the continuity of previous mandates? Conversely, in your opinion, what have been the most explicit areas of agreement?
Before this legislature, the EPP and S&D groups ran the show in the European Parliament! It was the sort of show that exists, for example, in the German Bundestag. This legislature (2019-2024) made a distinction between the MEPs who are part of the European “system” and those who remain at a distance. The four groups EPP, S&D, Renew and the Greens were a kind of quartet in building majorities. It was an unusual configuration that highlighted a high level of dialogue between very different political groups.
However, dissensions were observed: the EPP returned to its political roots toward the end of the mandate. This was notably the case with the nature protection text, where the group backtracked from its pro-environment dynamic observed during the implementation of the Green Deal. Particularities were also observed: on digital issues, both the Greens and the S&D emphasised the importance of privacy, personal rights and the environment. These approaches were largely shared by decisionmakers and citizens, so the negotiated texts reflect collective preferences specific to Europeans that cannot be found in other regions of the world.
This notion of a “common culture” is a reminder that beyond partisan visions, institutional logic is at work within the European Union; the European Parliament argues against the Council or the Commission. And this institutional logic often transcends political colours. This was particularly evident during the Conference on the Future of Europe. The Parliament was the institution most supportive of this unprecedented project, which may seem paradoxical for a stakeholder that could have seen it as competition for its own legitimacy. The Council frostily received the idea, and it was indeed the Parliament that was both the driving force and the advocate for this initiative led by the Commission.
Events like the COVID crisis or the war in Ukraine, on the other hand, largely escaped the European Parliament’s control. The Council had to take the lead. In these crises, the limitations of the parliamentary institution were plain to see. While it was trying to be helpful, for example by opening its premises to the sick or those in need during the pandemic, the Parliament was unable to be the force of resolution. In these crises, von der Leyen’s Commission, which had started its mandate as focusing on being the guardian of the treaties, regained a leading role and became the driving force, as it should. Regarding the governance of the recovery plan, for example, the lack of involvement of the Parliament was regrettable, as most of the action took place through dialogue between the Commission and the Member States.
Q3. How would you characterise the state of relations between the European Parliament (EP) and other institutions, particularly the Commission? It is worth noting that Mrs von der Leyen was elected as president with a majority of only nine votes in 2019, and that dissenting voices and other manoeuvres were observed, especially within the EPP…
Ursula von der Leyen was at first a victim of how she came to her position. Although she came from the EPP, the Parliament wanted to get its revenge on the European Council, which proposed a candidate who was not a Spitzenkandidat [a lead candidate]. Historically, the Parliament has always wanted to have more influence in the choice of the Commission President. Ursula von der Leyen’s nomination, submitted by the European Council, caused animosity in the Parliament more against the procedure used than against the candidate herself.
However, when Mrs von der Leyen returned to the MEPs with her College of Commissioners and the Green Deal, which broadened her support base, she demonstrated an ability to understand and take into account the political power dynamics of the Parliament in defining her mandate. The construction of her recent State of the Union address reflected this. Consequently, she quickly gained the favour and support of the hemicycle. She realized the need to have the European Parliament on her side to implement the Green Deal, which itself echoed the results of the 2019 elections.
Nevertheless, the Commission President should not be instrumentalised by the Parliament, and Mrs von der Leyen had to assert her independence from it regularly. For instance, the European Parliament is the most steadfast institution when it comes to the rule of law and the most expansive in its interpretation of the concept. On Hungarian and Polish cases, the Commission sometimes found itself in an uncomfortable position between the Council and the European Parliament, with MEPs even declaring their readiness to trigger a vote of no confidence in the Commission, while the College was considering releasing the recovery funds intended for the Polish government in the summer of 2022.
Tensions also emerged between Ursula von der Leyen and her political group, the EPP, particularly due to its President, Manfred Weber. In 2019 he was the Spitzenkandidat of the group and, according to parliamentary logic, aspired to the Commission presidency until the European Council blocked his path. Moreover, EPP members may have felt that the Commission presidency had drifted too far from the fundamentals of their party, with social and even societal positions that were too distant from Christian-democratic orthodoxy. As the elections approached, the group sought to differentiate itself and demanded assurances from Mrs von der Leyen, which she provided through her State of the Union address.
Q4. Based on your recent observations, what type of election can we expect in June 2024 and what are the potential consequences?
This question should be treated with caution: the elections are still several months away, and our era, marked by the volatility of opinions and the rapid and uncertain succession of destabilising events, should lead to even greater modesty in forecasting exercises. The climate crisis, inflation, purchasing power, and the war in Ukraine are all subjects whose evolution will impact voter behaviour. We are also discussing this before the Polish elections, which will be crucial for the political dynamics in Europe, and as the Spanish elections continue somewhat, in the absence of a clear coalition.
That said, I expect an even more pronounced fragmentation of the hemicycle, with the far right divided between its “pro-Russian” and “pro-Ukraine” components. The ECR group could be part of a future majority if it gains importance, for example, if the Law and Justice Party (PiS) maintains its position in Poland. The experience of Meloni in Italy also tends to demonstrate that this group is acceptable due to the strong Western orientation of its members. Consequently, a certain permeability between the EPP and the ECR group could be envisaged, which could lead to compromises that would not include other groups, such as the Greens, for example. The European Union’s green ambitions could be diminished, as well as the European Parliament’s vigilance regarding the rule of law, while defence, economic activity, or agriculture topics could gain prominence. In any case, identifying the future majority in the European Parliament is currently challenging. The risk is that it remains unclear even after the election. A fragmented hemicycle would inevitably have less weight in the European decision-making process.
