Interview with Philippe Perchoc, Head of the Brussels office of the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) of the French École militaire, Visiting Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL), Sciences Po Paris and the College of Europe (Bruges)
Q1. In your opinion, what role does the European Council currently play in the EU’s institutional landscape? Could it be said that it has successfully taken on a leading role in shaping European political strategy? Do you believe that its relations with the European Commission and the Parliament have improved?
At the beginning, the European Council did not exist, and the institutions were organised accordingly. It was the “sectoral” ministers who would meet and who had to negotiate directly with the High Authority of the ECSC and, from 1957 onwards, with the European Commission. On the other hand, “Summits” were organised for Heads of State because there was a need to address difficult topics and tackle foreign policy matters, which were excluded from the scope of the European Community. Generally, these “Summits” took place outside of Brussels, to differentiate them from the community institutions. The smaller Member States were opposed to the idea of institutionalising these meetings as they deemed it an encroachment on the “community method”. Nevertheless, in 1974, President Giscard d’Estaing’s idea of the European Council was created, against the wishes of the smaller Member States. The idea found favour with Jean Monnet, who had imagined it as a “provisional European Government” with the idea that it would precede a united European government.
However, it was only with the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) that the European Council was elevated to the status of an EU institution! Before that, it was only mentioned in the Treaties. The powers of the European Council are not clearly defined: it has all the powers that the Treaties grant it and… all the powers that the Treaties do not grant it. Consequently, Heads of State and Government can resolve conflicts not settled at a lower level or tackle much more serious matters that are sometimes completely out of the scope of the Treaties (e.g., reactions to the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis and the COVID Crisis). The European Council also has the power to nominate, notably the President of the European Commission, as well as other leaders. For example, since the Treaty of Lisbon, the full-time president of the European Council is elected by their peers for a two-and-a-half-year term, with the possibility of renewal once. The President tries to ensure continuity in the institutional works even if, in practice, it is actually the Commission that carries it out.
In fact, the European Council is primarily a crisis management body. It provides little impetus, firstly, because it lacks the necessary resources. The President of the Council’s team is limited to a team of a dozen people, who do not have the necessary administrative powers. On the contrary, the Commission has the expertise required to transform the direction desired by the European Council into legislative processes. Secondly, because the sitting Heads of State and Government do not have the time to do more: in the space of just a few hours, they must address five or six subjects that are prepared by their ambassadors before their meeting. Regarding the relationship between the European Council and the Commission, it is clear that it is not always smooth. This is largely due to the fact that the Commission, which is operating in an increasingly “presidential” manner, does not feel completely subordinate to the European Council and also contributes a lot of ideas. The Commission argues that it is at the heart of the legislative machinery.
Q2. What do you think of Charles Michel’s (2019-2024) record as the President of the European Council? How has his tenure differed from those of his predecessors Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, and how has he shaped the Council’s evolution?
Before focusing on individuals, it is important to remember that we do not know what is discussed within the European Council: the meeting room is closed, and only the Council members and the general secretariats of the Council and the Parliament are privy to the discussions. It is normal for these proceedings to be discrete, given the negotiations that take place there. In this context, the active, passive and even strategic role of the President is difficult to discern. Nevertheless, it can be observed that Charles Michel has been actively involved in foreign policy issues, which has not always been the case for his predecessors, especially concerning the Caucasus (the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan). The Heads of State also chose to extend his mandate after two-and-a-half years, which is a good sign, indicating their satisfaction. And there are certainly accomplishments to his record, specifically his proactiveness in response to crises. He, together with others, has contributed to the establishment of the “Next Generation EU” recovery plan in response to COVID and to the EU’s substantial action to the war in Ukraine, demonstrating real ambition regarding enlargement.
Q3. More specifically, how have you observed the political alliances and divisions within the European Council change under the mandate of its President, the former Belgian Prime Minister, Charles Michel (2019-2024)?
Europe is progressing because of its shifting fault lines, which are fortunately not always the same. These fault lines stem from history and culture. They act as a driving force: concessions are made on one issue to advance on another… It is this succession of different issues, revealing the different divisions among Member States, that allows progress to happen. It is also clear that with Brexit, the Member States that used to hide behind the United Kingdom to push their ideas now have to defend them on their own. The fault lines have not necessarily moved on these issues, but they have become more visible again.
Therefore, the real question is identifying the four or five most important issues and seeing how to progress on them, depending on the fault lines arising from them. The Green Deal is a good example: eliciting large consensus in 2019, it became contentious in the lead up to the European elections. Defending Ukraine and Europe are a second issue, with fault lines, for example, between Altaicists and advocates for a European-based defence. The future of Europe in the relations between China and the United States is a third issue: what will the consequences of operations in the South China Sea, around Taiwan, be for the EU and how will it position itself on the international stage? Immigration remains another prominent issue: to be cavalier, one could say that on this issue, no one is for it, but not in the same way…
That being said, I am not certain that the fault lines have changed significantly. Regarding enlargement, that has indeed been a revival of political dynamics thanks to the Ukrainian crisis, allowing for a shift from a technical approach, for example, granting candidate status to new states, but the reservations of some persist. The same can be said for the economy. Of course, there was a crisis, and that is why there was large-scale borrowing, but will Member States decide to renew this experience? Will we go from “revolution” to “tradition” regarding debt mutualisation? Currently, that is not a foregone conclusion. On defence, beyond the issue of helping Ukraine, it is primarily about replenishing stocks of arms and ammunition. Have we overcome political divisions there too? That is not clear… We cannot say for certain that there will be a push for a broader strategic vision and operational deployments, for example.
Q4. What impact could the Polish elections (especially the victory of the pro-European centre-right opposition led by Donald Tusk) have on the alliances within the European Council?
For the moment it is very difficult to say because the Polish President has not changed and retains significant powers regarding the country’s political direction. Additionally, Poland has not changed its geographical position… nor its fundamental interests. On immigration, for example, will its position change radically? That is far from certain. On Ukraine, Poland will remain pro-enlargement but, at the same time, attentive to defending the interests of its many farmers. Ukraine is, indeed, a “major player” in agriculture, and the Warsaw government will use this issue as a bargaining chip in the enlargement process. Regarding the cohesion of the Višegrad group, we must not kid ourselves: its members did not agree on everything from the beginning, and some recent elections in Hungary or in Slovakia have moved in the opposite direction to what has been observed in Poland or in the Czech Republic.
That being said, Poland’s image will certainly change within European circles. It may become a driving force in debates once again. And on the thorny issue of the rule of law, an issue that Donald Tusk’s platform campaigned on, we will likely see a position more aligned with EU values and a gradual normalisation of relations with the Commission, even more so than with the European Council. This could unblock certain issues, particularly related to accessing EU funding from the recovery plan. So, all in all, these elections do not change the fundamental scope of relations with Poland but allow for the outline of a resurgence of Warsaw’s credibility and the normalisation of certain issues.
Q5. What do you think are the greatest challenges that the European Council must confront today as an institution?
We can identify the main topics that are likely to occupy the European Council. Firstly, there are the US elections and the consequences they will have for Europe, as well as how the EU and its Member States will position themselves in relation to Washington. Secondly, there are the European elections, with significant changes in leadership roles occurring at the same time as the change in leadership at NATO. Then there is the issue of Ukraine. Firstly, through the support provided by the EU and the Member States to Ukraine. The challenge of supporting Kyiv in its struggle against Moscow will remain essential because the EU’s security is at stake. Furthermore, if the Americans reduce their support, the EU will be called upon to contribute more, both financially and militarily. Then, of course, there is the question of enlargement to Ukraine, as well as other candidate or aspiring member states, which raises the issue of revising the Treaties, especially in terms of EU governance. This strategic decision has implications for budgetary, defence, and agricultural issues – in essence, the revision of almost all EU policies. There is therefore indeed a connection between the future of Ukraine and that of Europe! Finally, there remains the risk of a new migration crisis, which could be triggered by events in the Middle East and would remain a challenge for the European Union and the European Council.
Interview conducted on 23rd October 2023
